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There is a long-standing debate over whether the passage of time causes forgetting from working
memory, a process called trace decay. Researchers providing evidence against the existence of trace
decay generally study memory by presenting familiar verbal memory items for 1 s or more per memory
item, during the study period. In contrast, researchers providing evidence for trace decay tend to use
unfamiliar nonverbal memory items presented for 1 s or less per memory item, during the study period.
Taken together, these investigations suggest that familiar items may not decay while unfamiliar items do
decay. The availability of verbal rehearsal and the time to consolidate a memory item into working
memory during presentation may also play a role in whether or not trace decay will occur. Here we
explore these alternatives in a series of experiments closely modeled after studies demonstrating
time-based forgetting from working memory, but using familiar verbal memory items in place of the
unfamiliar memory items used to observe decay in the past. Our findings suggest that time-based
forgetting is persistent across all of these factors while simultaneously challenging prominent views of
trace decay.
Keywords: working memory, short-term memory, recognition, trace decay, forgetting

(e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Baddeley & Logie, 1999; Barrouillet & Camos, 2012; Cowan, 1995; J. Brown, 1958). This
causal role for time in forgetting is called trace decay. Temporary
memory-trace decay has also been questioned ever since that
period (e.g., Keppel & Underwood, 1962; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Brown, 2009; Nairne, 2002). The main aim of the present
research is to continue to resolve conflicting findings whereby
some paradigms and stimulus configurations result in findings
favoring decay while others do not.
The most straightforward demonstration consistent with tracedecay-based forgetting is to show that memory performance declines as the length of the retention interval between study and test
increases. Longer intervals should result in more decay and thus, in
more forgetting. This pattern of results was first demonstrated
several decades ago when researchers showed that verbal information is lost over short periods of time when the retention interval
is filled with a distracting task (e.g., J. Brown, 1958; Peterson &
Peterson, 1959; see Ricker, Vergauwe, & Cowan, 2016, for a
recent review). These findings are not in question, but they are not
sufficient to demonstrate decay because they occur in situations in
which interference from a distracting task during the retention
interval may accumulate across intervals, resulting in loss over
time not due to decay but rather to interference. Dissociating
interference and decay theories of forgetting is often complex
(Barrouillet, Plancher, Guida, & Camos, 2013).
The rationale for having participants carry out a distracting task
during retention, such as counting backward, was that it would
prevent participants from engaging in maintenance processes that

There is a long history of debate over the causes of forgetting in
working memory. Is forgetting from working memory better explained with a contribution of decay, or with only interference and
no decay? Working memory is the temporarily accessible information that is immediately available for ongoing use in cognition.
One can think of it as the mental workspace for cognition. From
the birth of cognitive psychology, a causal role of time leading to
forgetting has been central to many theories of working memory
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could counteract decay-based forgetting. This paradigm has provoked intense debates between decay and interference-only advocates. Proponents of interference-only models of forgetting have
argued that distractor tasks typically introduce interference. Longer retention intervals typically contain more distracting events
resulting in more interference, mimicking the effects of decay
where none exist. From this premise, it is argued that interferencebased accounts may provide a better explanation of the observed
decline in working memory performance with longer retention
intervals (e.g., Berman, Jonides, & Lewis, 2009; Lewandowsky &
Oberauer, 2015; Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2008). Distracting
tasks designed to manipulate the duration of the retention interval
while holding the level of interference relatively constant often
do not provide evidence for time-based forgetting (e.g., Lewandowsky, Duncan, & Brown, 2004; Oberauer & Lewandowsky,
2008; although for exceptions, see Cowan & AuBuchon, 2008;
Cowan, Nugent, Elliott, & Geer, 2000; Reitman, 1974; Watkins,
Watkins, Craik, & Mazuryk, 1973), instead these investigations
support interference-only accounts of forgetting in working
memory.
The current study addresses the mixed evidence for trace decay
in the field. In particular, two sets of findings helped inform the
current research: a set of findings related to articulatory rehearsal,
and a set of findings related to short-term consolidation. Below, we
briefly describe each of these, before describing the current study.

Trace Decay and Verbal Rehearsal in
Working Memory
Several prominent theories of working memory argue that decay
can only be observed if articulatory rehearsal of the memory items
is prevented (Baddeley, 1986; Camos, Lagner, & Barrouillet,
2009; Cowan, 1988). At the same time, arguments against the
existence of trace decay make clear that interference must be held
constant across differing retention intervals if one is to rule out
interference as the sole cause of forgetting over time. This creates
a problem as procedures that prevent rehearsal tend to introduce
interference that increases with longer retention intervals. One
must prevent rehearsal to observe decay, but doing so paradoxically introduces interference and negates the ability to test for
decay. A few researchers have managed to avoid this circular
problem with clever experimental design, sometimes resulting in
conclusions against the existence of decay and other times in
conclusions favoring the existence of decay.
An elegant example of procedures minimizing interference differences across retention interval differences while also controlling
for the role of articulatory rehearsal comes from Lewandowsky,
Duncan, and Brown (2004). In this study participants were tasked
with remembering lists of six letters, presented serially, and then
recalling those letters in the same serial order. Participants were
trained to recall the letters at different speeds, thereby changing the
length of memory retention required. Slower recall speeds resulted
in longer memory retention. Critically, participants were sometimes required to engage in articulatory suppression between the
recalls of each memory item. Articulatory suppression is a procedure in which participants repeat an irrelevant word or phrase in
order to prevent them from verbally rehearsing target memory
items. Lewandowsky et al. (2004) observed no significant increase
in forgetting with slower recall speeds even when articulatory
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suppression was required, thereby implying a lack of trace decay.
This finding and the conclusions that follow are in sharp clear
opposition to the existence of trace decay as a general mechanism
of forgetting.
Oberauer and Lewandowsky (2008) also asked participants to
remember a list of six letters. In their experiments, participants
were trained to articulate a suppressor word, “super,” either once
or four times between either each memory item presentation or
each recall. Articulatory suppression always produced lower accuracy compared to a baseline no-suppression condition. However,
manipulation of the number of iterations of the suppressor did not
affect recall accuracy. It takes considerably longer to utter “super”
four times than once and given that participants engaged in suppression between each item presentation or each item recall, the
manipulation of retention duration was of considerable length. If
trace decay was occurring during memory retention, then a large
change in accuracy across suppression conditions should have
been observed. Again, these findings are in clear opposition to the
expectation that time causes forgetting through trace decay.
In these studies, retention duration was manipulated by increasing the number of times the suppressor was uttered. Longer retention intervals by definition also included more utterances that
could be predicted to induce interference, but no change in accuracy was observed across retention duration conditions. The explanation is that the suppresser caused little to no additional
forgetting beyond the first utterance. Repeated utterances of the
same stimulus are not assumed to cause additional forgetting in
some interference models of forgetting (Farrell & Lewandowsky,
2002; Oberauer, Lewandowsky, Farrell, Jarrold, & Greaves,
2012).
This approach is consistent with past work examining the effect
of suppression across a retention interval. Vallar and Baddeley
(1982) asked participants to remember three consonants with a
variable retention interval of up to 15 s before memory recall.
Several secondary tasks were also required during memory retention. When asked to concurrently count backward by 3 s during the
memory retention, gradual forgetting was observed across the
retention interval. When asked to concurrently engage in articulatory suppression during the retention interval, performance was
equivalent across all retention intervals. Just as with Oberauer and
Lewandowsky (2008), articulatory suppression produced lower
accuracy overall compared with a no-suppression baseline. These
findings are consistent with the approach of modern interference
models positing that distracting tasks with changing-state stimuli
induce increasing interference-based forgetting as they continue,
but constant state articulatory suppression should not induce more
than a minimal initial amount of forgetting after its first iteration.
In sharp contrast to the above-described studies showing no
time-based forgetting during memory retention, supporting an
interference-only approach to forgetting, several studies have
found time-based forgetting across longer retention intervals. In
particular, visual array studies using articulatory suppression have
found time-based forgetting across a retention interval (CohenDallal, Fradkin, & Pertzov, 2018; Woodman, Vogel, & Luck,
2012; Zhang & Luck, 2009). In visual array studies, two or more
items are presented simultaneously for a brief period of time. In a
typical experiment, three to eight items are presented for roughly
750 ms. A few seconds later, participants are presented with either
the entire array or a single item from the array and they must
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indicate whether or not an item has changed. In some variations of
the task, participants must reproduce the color, orientation, or
some similar feature of the memory item by moving the mouse to
the proper position on a response slider/probe (e.g., Cohen-Dallal
et al., 2018). In all variations of the task the retention interval
between presentation and test is manipulated so that any timebased forgetting that exists can be observed. The time-based forgetting observed across differing retention intervals in these studies introduces a clear challenge to interference models that posit
that there is no trace decay and that articulatory suppression does
not cause forgetting.
One counterargument has been to indicate that many visual
array studies use articulatory suppression that does not include a
constant state utterance. Often participants must articulate two
numbers or words, not simply repeat a single word (e.g., Woodman et al., 2012; Zhang & Luck, 2009). The identity of the
suppressers also often changes from trial to trial, with new suppressor words presented at the beginning of each trial.
Interference-only proponents opposed to the existence of decay
can argue that interference comes from the suppresser in these
contexts, although there are some findings showing time-based
loss without suppression (C. C. Morey & Bieler, 2013; Lilienthal,
Hale, & Myerson, 2014). This interference explanation of timebased forgetting with visual arrays can accommodate many findings using memory items composed of familiar features such as
color or orientation when combined with articulatory suppression.
Other visual array studies present even greater difficulty for
interference-only theories. Specifically, these studies use unfamiliar memory items as memoranda and observe forgetting across the
retention interval in the absence of any secondary task and without
articulatory suppression (Ricker & Cowan, 2010, 2014; Ricker,
Spiegel, & Cowan, 2014; Sakai & Inui, 2002; Vergauwe, Camos,
& Barrouillet, 2014). These visual array studies are similar to other
visual array change detection tasks in all regards except that they
used unfamiliar symbols as memory items. Ricker and Cowan
(2010) also included the same visual array task, but instead of
using unfamiliar symbols they used familiar letters as memoranda.
They observed no time-based forgetting when letters were used.
Surprisingly, when Ricker, Spiegel, and Cowan (2014) also performed a visual array memory task with familiar letters as the
memory stimuli, they found strong evidence for trace decay across
the retention interval under conditions with and without articulatory suppression. This conflict in findings between those who find
evidence for decay (e.g., Ricker & Cowan, 2010; Ricker et al.,
2014) and those who find evidence against decay (e.g., Lewandowsky et al., 2004; Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2008) introduces confusion as to whether or not we should observe trace
decay of familiar verbal memory items in a visual array task.
Together the literature on trace decay indicates several clear
findings: (a) serial recall of familiar verbal items does not produce
time-based forgetting even in the presence of articulatory suppression (Lewandowsky et al., 2004; Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2008;
Vallar & Baddeley, 1982); (b) familiar visual memory items are
forgotten over time in the presence of articulatory suppression
(Woodman et al., 2012; Zhang & Luck, 2009); and (c) unfamiliar
visual memory items are forgotten over time even without the
presence of articulatory suppression (Ricker & Cowan, 2010,
2014; Ricker et al., 2014; Sakai & Inui, 2002; Vergauwe et al.,
2014). While this set of findings makes it clear that some condi-

tions are conducive to finding evidence for decay and others are
not, it remains unclear why each of these situations is somewhat
different with respect to the effects of time and articulatory suppression. The present study addresses this issue.

Trace Decay and Consolidation in Working Memory
Ricker and Cowan (2014) examined several different presentation procedures that may be responsible for the observation of
time-based forgetting in some studies and not in others by using
unfamiliar symbols as memory items. The unfamiliar characters
included letters, numbers, and single-character words drawn from
languages not spoken by the participants, but similar in visual
complexity to English numbers and letters that were familiar to the
participants. They found evidence for decay in all conditions,
regardless of whether sequential or simultaneous presentation of
memory items was used. Differences in mask onset time following
stimulus presentation did not affect the presence of time-based
forgetting. Changes in the amount of free time following each
memory item presentation, referred to as the consolidation time,
did result in changes in the forgetting rate, although some amount
of forgetting over time was still observed across all consolidation
conditions. Although Ricker and Cowan (2014) manipulated consolidation time by manipulating the amount of free time following item presentation, total consolidation time is generally
measured beginning at memory item onset and continuing as
long as attention remains focused on the memory item (Jolicoeur
& Dell’Acqua, 1998; Ricker & Hardman, 2017; Wyble, Potter,
Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, 2011).
Ricker and Cowan (2014) proposed that sensory memory traces
undergo a short-term consolidation process immediately following
memory item presentation (for similar proposals see also, Jolicoeur
& Dell’Acqua, 1998; Nieuwenstein & Wyble, 2014). This process
requires that attention is directed toward the memory representation and increases the trace’s resistance to forgetting processes
such as interference and trace decay1 (Ricker, 2015; Ricker &
Cowan, 2014). The consolidation process differs from encoding
processes in this view. Encoding processes are responsible for
establishing a working memory trace and are ended by masking
(Ricker, 2015; Ricker & Sandry, 2018; Vogel, Woodman, & Luck,
2006; Woodman & Vogel, 2005). Short-term consolidation solidifies newly created working memory traces against forgetting
processes, thereby allowing their continued maintenance. Shortterm consolidation is not ended by masking, but rather continues as
long as attention is directed toward the memory item immediately
following presentation or until consolidation is complete (Ricker,
2015; Ricker, Nieuwenstein, Bayliss, & Barrouillet, 2018). The
finding of Ricker and Cowan (2014) that more free time after each
memory item results in less time-based forgetting implies that the
existence of forgetting over time in one study, but not another, may
simply be due to differences in the amount of time available for
consolidation across studies. Unlike the findings related to articulatory rehearsal, the role of short-term consolidation in trace decay
1
The reduction in time-based loss following short-term consolidation
could result from a decreased rate of forgetting or a decreased probability
that forgetting will occur on any given trial. Both scenarios would reduce
the mean rate of time-based forgetting observed across many trials.
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is largely unexplored, making its exploration a priority for understanding trace decay.
This explanation that trace decay results from insufficient consolidation time is not without its flaws. It has trouble explaining
the observation of time-based forgetting by Lilienthal et al. (2014),
even with presentation times longer than the proposed limits of
working memory consolidation (Jolicoeur & Dell’Acqua, 1998;
Ricker & Hardman, 2017; Ricker & Sandry, 2018). It also does not
adequately address long running assumptions about the role of
articulatory suppression in observing decay (Baddeley, Thomson,
& Buchanan, 1975; Cowan et al., 1992) and does not examine
whether familiar memory items decay when presented with insufficient time for full consolidation into working memory.

The Present Study
The present work addresses the issues raised in the preceding
pages by investigating whether we can observe trace decay with
familiar memory items. In the following experiments, we investigate whether memory for arrays of letters decay with the passage
of time across retention intervals of different durations. To foreshadow, multiple large sample-size experiments demonstrate
strong time-based forgetting of familiar memory items in a variety
of contexts. Having established this premise, we explore a number
of questions raised by contrasting findings in the literature. Specifically, we explore (a) the role of articulatory suppression in
determining the rate of forgetting, (b) whether the time available
for consolidation determines whether time-based forgetting is observed, and (c) whether familiar verbal and visual memory stimuli
behave differently with respect to the passage of time. An overview of the experiments can be found in Table 1.

Experiment 1
In our first experiment, we explore trace decay with familiar
memory items using a procedure closely modeled after two studies: Ricker and Cowan (2010), who provide evidence for trace
decay of unfamiliar visual memory arrays but not for familiar
verbal item arrays, and Ricker et al. (2014), who provide evidence
for trace decay of both unfamiliar visual and familiar verbal
memory arrays. In our current procedure, English-speaking participants were briefly presented with visual arrays of six English
letters that had to be remembered for use in a change-detection test
seconds later (see Figure 1). The length of retention was manipulated to allow the observation of any trace decay across the
retention interval, should any exist. This procedure was conducted
under three different articulatory suppression conditions in order to
examine the role of verbal rehearsal in observing trace decay.
If familiar memory items do not decay we should see no
time-based forgetting across the variable retention interval duration in any suppression condition. Alternatively, familiar items
may decay and suppression may prevent ongoing maintenance
activities such as verbal rehearsal. In this case, we should observe
time-based forgetting in the articulatory suppression conditions
that prevent verbal rehearsal and no time-based forgetting in the no
suppression condition because verbal rehearsal can take place.
Finally, if visual array presentation always leads to conditions
under which trace decay will be observed, then we should see
time-based forgetting in all conditions.
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Method
Participants. Eighty students attending the University of Missouri participated in the experiment. Twenty participants were
excluded from data analysis for one of the three following reasons.
First, 17 participants demonstrated near chance level performance
(53% correct or less) in one or more conditions. These participants
were excluded in order to avoid floor effects. Second, two participants did not follow articulation instructions after repeated
prompts. Third, data from one participant was lost due to a computer error. This left a sample size of 60 participants (31 female)
for use in all analyses.2 All were fluent speakers of English with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. This experiment was approved by the University of Missouri Institutional Review Board.
Materials. On each trial, all memory items were selected at
random without replacement from the full set of 26 English letters.
All letters were presented in upper-case 18 point Courier New font.
The masking item consisted of the symbols “⬎” and “⬍” superimposed upon one another at the location of all memory items
simultaneously. These masking symbols were designed to be
roughly the same size and dimensions as the average uppercase
letter. All letters, masks, and the fixation cross were presented in
black while the rest of the screen was gray in color.
Design. A breakdown of the methodological differences
across all experiments is presented in Table 1. Experiment 1 had
three suppression conditions. In the “none” condition participants
did not engage in articulatory suppression. In the “maintenanceonly” condition participants only engaged in suppression during
the retention interval. In the “full trial” condition participants
engaged in articulatory suppression during the entire trial. There
were also three retention duration conditions that varied in total
length. This resulted in a 3 (suppression condition: none,
maintenance-only, full trial) ⫻ 3 (retention duration: 1,500 ms,
3,000 ms, or 6,000 ms) within-subjects design. The retention
durations were the same as used by Ricker and Cowan (2010).
Suppression condition, but not retention duration, was manipulated
between blocks, with the order of conditions fully counterbalanced
across participants. There were nine experimental blocks in total.
All three blocks of each suppression condition were completed
before the next suppression condition was introduced. Each suppression condition was broken into three blocks in order to allow
the participants to rest after prolonged articulation. Our analyses
indicated that there was no effect of counterbalance order so we do
not discuss counterbalancing further.
2
To be thorough we also ran our analyses of Experiments 1–5 without
excluding any participants. The results demonstrated the same pattern of
effects as indicated in the results sections of each experiment. In Experiment 1, only 15 of the 20 excluded participants had usable data files, so
only these 15 participants were included in the reanalysis. The addition of
the excluded participants in Experiment 1 did introduce a suppression
condition by counterbalance order interaction. A large amount of the
excluded participants happened to be from one counterbalance order. The
interaction appears to be a function of the lower overall accuracy in
the suppression conditions of this counterbalance order relative to other
counterbalance orders. It is also important to note that the overall difficulty
of our task was not too hard for the participants to complete. Of the 471
participants across our studies, only six demonstrated overall mean accuracy at or below chance. Our exclusion criteria were fairly aggressive in an
attempt to prevent any possible floor effects in only the most difficult
conditions.
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Table 1
Manipulations Used Across Experiments
Experiment

Presentation duration

Other factor manipulated

Exp. 1
Exp. 2a
Exp. 2b
Exp. 3
Exp. 4
Exp. 5

750 ms
3 ⫻ 250 ms
3 ⫻ 250 ms
3 ⫻ 50 ms
3 ⫻ 250 ms
3 ⫻ 250 ms

Articulatory Suppression
Consolidation Time
Consolidation Time
Consolidation Time
Consolidation Time
Consolidation Time

Retention duration was manipulated between trials such that
each block contained 10 trials at each retention duration, for a total
of 30 trials per block or 270 trials in all. Retention duration on any
given trial within a block was determined by random sampling
without replacement from this set of durations. Before the first
experimental block of each suppression condition (i.e., Blocks 1, 4,
and 7) 10 practice trials were given along with training on how to
perform articulatory suppression correctly for the relevant condition. All practice trials used a 3,000-ms retention duration.
Procedure. An example of an experimental trial is depicted in
Figure 1. Each trial was initiated by button press and began with
the presentation of a fixation cross for 1,000 ms. Next, six English
letters were presented concurrently in an array for 750 ms. Participants were instructed to remember all of the letters in this memory
array. All letters were presented at random locations within a 72
mms ⫻ 54 mm invisible box located at the center of the screen,
with the constraint that no letter could appear at fixation or overlap
another letter in the array. After letter presentation, the screen was
blank for 250 ms, after which the masking array appeared for 100
ms. Following mask offset the retention interval began and lasted
for either 1,500 ms, 3,000 ms, or 6,000 ms. When the retention
interval ended, a single probe item was presented on screen at the
location of one of the memory items from the memory array and
black circles were presented at the spatial location of all other
items from the memory array. Participants were asked to indicate
whether the probe item was the same as the item at that location in
the memory array or different by pressing the “s” or “d” key,
respectively. On half of the trials within each block the probe item

Figure 1. An example of a single experimental trial, Experiment 1.

Stimuli
Letters
Letters
Letters
Letters
Letters
Colors

(all)
(all)
(no vowels)
(no vowels)
(no vowels)

Set size
6
6
6
6
3 or 6
3 or 6

was different than the item in the memory array. When the item
was different it was always a new item not used in any location
within the memory array.
The start and pace of articulatory suppression was indicated by
onset of a repeating metronome click sequence that clicked three
times per second and lasted until the probe item appeared on
screen. Participants were to speak the word “the” audibly at any
volume they wished every time the metronome clicked. In the
maintenance-only condition the metronome sequence began at
masking array offset. In the full trial condition the metronome
sequence began earlier in the trial, with onset of the initial fixation
cross. An experimenter monitored suppression for all participants.
If a participant stopped suppression or suppressed incorrectly the
experimenter waited until the trial was over then reminded the
participant of the need to suppress appropriately.
Analysis. Before conducting any analyses we removed all
trials from the data set that had reaction times (RTs) shorter than
300 ms or longer than 3,000 ms (6% percent of all trials). This was
done to remove easily identifiable responses in which the participant was not paying attention to the current trial sequence.
For our main inferential statistic we calculate Bayes factors for
ANOVA and t tests. These Bayes factors indicate the probability
of the data when assuming an effect is present relative to the
probability of the data when assuming no effect is present. In other
words, a Bayes factor of 10 in favor of an effect indicates that the
data are 10 times more probable if there is an effect than if there
is not an effect present. A Bayes factor of 14 in favor of the null
would indicate that the data are 14 times more probable if there is
no effect present than if there is an effect present. In the case of
ANOVA we calculate Bayes factors for both main effects and their
interaction. Bayes factor calculations for ANOVA follow the
method described by Rouder, Morey, Speckman, and Province
(2012) while Bayes factor calculations for t tests follow the
method described by Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, and Iverson
(2009), both implemented through the “Bayes Factor” package
(Version 0.9.12–2; R. Morey & Rouder, 2013) for the R statistical
computing language.
The Bayes factor is also an updating factor for updating beliefs
logically and consistently in light of data (Kass & Raftery, 1995;
Rouder, Morey, Verhagen, Province, & Wagenmakers, 2016). It
indicates the amount that prior beliefs should change given the
data. In the context of our experiments a Bayes factor of 2 in favor
of the alternative hypothesis indicates that your posterior beliefs
about the odds of alternative hypothesis generating the data are
twice as likely as your prior beliefs about the odds of alternative
hypothesis generating the data.
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Discussion

Figure 2. Mean proportion correct as a function of retention duration and
suppression condition in Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard error
of the mean. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

Results
Mean performance in each condition is presented in Figure 2. It
is clear from the figure that forgetting occurred as a function of
time. The presence of articulatory suppression impaired performance, but did not change the rate of forgetting. A 3 (retention
duration) ⫻ 3 (suppression condition) repeated measures ANOVA
of mean proportion correct confirmed these observations. This test
produced a clear main effect of retention duration, F(2, 118) ⫽ 44,
p2 ⫽ .43, Bayes factor ⫽ 2.7 ⫻ 1011 in favor of an effect, with
performance decreasing as the retention interval increases. There
was a clear main effect of suppression dondition, F(2, 118) ⫽ 33,
p2 ⫽ .36, Bayes factor ⫽ 1.07 ⫻ 1014 in favor of an effect, with
superior performance in the no suppression condition relative the
suppression conditions. There was no interaction between the two
effects, F(4, 236) ⫽ 0.66, p2 ⫽ .01, Bayes factor ⫽ 156 in favor
of the null.
In order to compare the rate of forgetting with familiar materials
as observed in the present work to the rate of forgetting with
unfamiliar materials as observed in previous studies, we computed
the rate of forgetting for each participant in the present study as
well as in Experiment 1 of Ricker and Cowan (2010). It is
important to note that the present study was modeled after of
Ricker and Cowan (2010) and, as such, replicated the procedure
except in that the present work used familiar memory items and the
secondary task was articulatory suppression. The six-item array
size used in the current study was selected because it results in
accuracies that are very similar to the accuracies observed by
Ricker and Cowan (2010) with three unfamiliar characters. Thus,
to compare the rates of forgetting between familiar and unfamiliar
materials, we calculated the rates of forgetting for each participant
in both studies. The rate of forgetting was operationalized as the
difference in mean accuracy between the shortest and longest
retention intervals. A larger difference score represents more forgetting. We then conducted an independent samples t test comparing the rates of forgetting in each study. There was no observable
difference in the rate of forgetting between the familiar and unfamiliar memory items, t(51) ⫽ 0.26, Bayes factor ⫽ 4.17 in favor
of the null.

In Experiment 1 we varied the presence of articulatory suppression in three conditions, from no suppression to suppression
throughout the entire encoding and delay periods. Time-based
forgetting occurred to the same degree in all conditions, even with
no suppression or secondary task to induce interference. The loss
across delay periods in all conditions cannot be explained by
interference, inasmuch as it occurred even during an unfilled
interval with no suppression. The large main effect of suppression
apparently was caused by some other mechanism (e.g., distraction)
that does not interact with delay period, unlike the putative role of
this suppression in preventing rehearsal.
While this experiment demonstrates time-based forgetting of
familiar material across a retention interval, many other studies
have not found the same result (Barrouillet, Bernardin, & Camos,
2004; Lewandowsky et al., 2004; Oberauer & Lewandowsky,
2014). One clear difference between our study and other common
paradigms is in the amount of short-term consolidation time per
item. In the same paradigm as we use here, but with visual,
nonverbal materials, we have previously argued that the rate of
trace decay is determined by the amount of time given for shortterm consolidation immediately following item presentation
(Ricker & Cowan, 2014). Short-term consolidation is the attentionbased stabilization process that allows strengthening of the sensory
memory trace into a working memory trace. The assumption is that
short-term consolidation protects against forgetting that may result
from increased time and/or interference (Jolicoeur & Dell’Acqua,
1998; Ricker, 2015). Ricker and Cowan (2014) varied the amount
of time available for attention to dwell on the memory items by
slightly increasing the length of time between item presentations
and found that more time to attend to the memory set resulted in
less forgetting over time. This finding implies that poorly consolidated working memory traces decay in a similar manner to sensory memory traces (Cowan, 1984; Ricker, 2015).
To operationalize this concept, we can consider poorly consolidated memory traces to be the memory traces for any items that
are not given ample time for attention to dwell on their internal
representation immediately following their presentation. Ricker
and Hardman (2017) estimated that about 600 –700 ms are required to fully consolidate simple visual memory items when each
memory stimulus is presented sequentially. Studies supporting
trace decay of unfamiliar memory items follow this pattern in that
nearly all of these studies allow only brief periods of time for item
consolidation (e.g., Ricker & Cowan, 2010, 2014; Ricker et al.,
2014; Vergauwe et al., 2014). Studies examining forgetting of
familiar verbal materials, however, have often used slow, sequential presentation of memoranda, resulting in longer consolidation
times per item and, thus, in firmly consolidated memory traces.
The importance of consolidation in working memory is clear
from past work. Jolicoeur and Dell’Acqua (1998) show similar
consolidation processes in both verbal and visual materials. When
consolidation times were limited to less than 1 s, Nieuwenstein and
Wyble (2014) demonstrated slightly larger accuracy impairments
with familiar memory items than with unfamiliar memory items.
When these results are considered in combination with the finding
that consolidation duration modifies time-based forgetting (Ricker
& Cowan, 2014), it is not surprising that time-based loss is
observed with brief presentation of familiar verbal memory items.
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In fact, it is the predicted result, as the present experiment utilizes
a short consolidation time that has resulted in considerable forgetting in past work. In Experiments 2 and 3 we test whether varying
the time available for consolidation also leads to a change in the
rate of forgetting with familiar memory items as it does with
unfamiliar items. Because articulatory suppression did not influence the rate of forgetting in Experiment 1, we did not include any
articulatory suppression conditions in the remaining experiments.
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Experiment 2
Recent work suggests that demonstrating trace decay with familiar verbal memoranda requires careful consideration of the
amount of time available for short-term consolidation of the tobe-remembered information. Indeed, Ricker and Cowan (2014)
recently addressed the contradiction between the existence of
time-based forgetting in some studies and not in others. This study
demonstrated that the amount of time given for memory consolidation determined the rate of forgetting over time observed in
change detection of unfamiliar visual character arrays. When
shorter presentation times were used, less consolidation was possible and faster rates of forgetting were observed.
This brings up a crucial methodological detail that is often
overlooked in studies of forgetting that may account for the fact
that we have observed decay for familiar materials in Experiment
1, while several previous studies have not. Familiar verbal memoranda are often presented in sequences, with the presentation time
in studies using familiar verbal memory items often much longer
per-item than the presentation times for studies using arrays of
visual memory items. In Experiment 2 we test whether time-based
forgetting over unfilled retention intervals is greater for poorly
consolidated familiar verbal memory items than for wellconsolidated familiar verbal memory items, just as it is with visual
memory items.
In Experiments 2a and 2b we manipulated the time available for
attention to dwell on the memory array while maintaining a constant presentation time. We did this by presenting the memory
array three times in a row, for 250 ms each time, with blank-screen
periods of either 150 ms or 500 ms between each array presentation. This manipulation was used by Ricker and Cowan (2014) and
maintains a 750 ms presentation time while also allowing attention
to dwell on the memory representation for a variable period of time
immediately following each array presentation. Longer blankscreens between presentations result in better short-term consolidation because of this increased dwell time (Bayliss, Bogdanovs,
& Jarrold, 2015; Nieuwenstein & Wyble, 2014; Ricker & Cowan,
2014; Ricker & Hardman, 2017; Ricker & Sandry, 2018).
Experiments 2a and 2b differ in only one methodological detail.
We wished to test whether the identification of familiar word
chunks was part of the consolidation process. In Experiment 2a the
memory items were sampled from the full set of 26 English letters
to allow the presence of word chunks. This is the same stimulus set
used in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2b vowels were excluded to
reduce the chance of participants chunking the letters as a word.
We found no differences in the pattern of results across experiments, other than a small overall increase in accuracy when vowels
were present, so we present the experiments together, with Experiment treated as a between-participants factor in the ANOVA.

Method
Participants. All participants were students attending Montclair State University. Seventy-nine adults participated in the Experiment 2a and 76 adults participated in Experiment 2b. Twelve
participants were excluded (four in Experiment 2a; eight in Experiment 2b) from data analysis because they demonstrated near
chance level performance (53% correct or less) in one or more
conditions (see Footnote 2). This left a sample size of 143 participants for use in all analyses. All participants were fluent in
English with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. This experiment was approved by the Montclair State University Institutional
Review Board.
Materials. In Experiment 2a the memory items were chosen
from the same set of 26 English letters as in Experiment 1. In
Experiment 2b the same English letters were used, excluding
vowels (A, E, I, O, U, and Y). Otherwise, all materials were the
same as in Experiment 1.
Design. Both experiments used an identical 2 (consolidation
condition: 150 ms or 500 ms) ⫻ 3 (retention duration: 1,500 ms,
3,000 ms, or 6,000 ms) within-subjects design. These presentation
and post-presentation consolidation durations roughly match those
used to observe an effect of consolidation time in Ricker and
Cowan (2014). There were six blocks of 36 trials each. There were
an equal number of all combinations of trial types within each
block. Trial order was determined randomly without replacement
within each block. 10 practice trials (500 ms consolidation time
and 3,000 ms retention time), with the option to repeat, preceded
the experimental blocks.
Procedure. The trial sequence was the same in Experiments
2a and 2b. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 except
for the following changes. During memory item presentation, the
memory array was no longer presented for 750 ms. Instead, the
memory array was presented three separate times in quick succession, with two periods during which the screen was blank dividing
these presentations (see Figure 3). Each of the individual memory
array presentations lasted for 250 ms (equating to 750 ms total
presentation time to match the presentation time in Experiment 1).
The blank screen periods lasted for either 150 ms or 500 ms,
depending on the condition. Within a trial, both of the blank
periods were the same duration. In Experiment 2 there was no
articulatory suppression.
Analysis. The analysis was the same as in Experiment 1.

Results
Mean performance in each condition is presented in Figure 4. It
is clear from the figure that forgetting occurred as a function of
time. Reducing the time for consolidation impaired performance,
but did not change the rate of forgetting. A 3 (retention duration) ⫻
2 (consolidation condition) ⫻ 2 (experiment) Repeated Measures
ANOVA of mean proportion correct confirms these observations.
This test produced a clear main effect of retention duration, F(2,
282) ⫽ 39.70, p2 ⫽ 0.22, Bayes factor ⫽ 3.9 ⫻ 1016 in favor of
an effect, with performance decreasing as the retention interval
increases. There was also a clear main effect of consolidation time,
F(1, 141) ⫽ 85.62, p2 ⫽ 0.38, Bayes factor ⫽ 3.9 ⫻ 1015 in favor
of an effect, with more time for consolidation leading to better
performance. There was a main effect of experiment, F(1, 141) ⫽
6.67, p2 ⫽ 0.05, Bayes factor ⫽ 3.7 in favor of an effect (means;
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An example of a single experimental trial, Experiment 2.

Experiment 2a/vowels ⫽ 0.85, Experiment 2b/no vowels ⫽ 0.82),
with superior performance when vowels were included in the
memory set. No interactions were present, all Bayes factors ⬎4 in
favor of the null. In particular, the interaction between consolidation time and retention duration produced a Bayes factor of 10 in
favor of the null.

symbols. Past work has shown faster consolidation of letters than
of symbols (Jolicoeur & Dell’Acqua, 1998). Perhaps the consolidation durations we allowed in Experiment’s 2a and b were too
long to observe the consolidation process for a set of letters. We
test this hypothesis in Experiment 3 by decreasing the time available for consolidation across all conditions.

Discussion
As in Experiment 1, we again found decay in all conditions. In
contrast to Ricker and Cowan (2014) who explored memory for
unfamiliar visual characters, we did not see a change in the decay
rate following a change in the time for consolidation of familiar
letters. One possibility for this discrepancy is that we designed the
presentation sequence timing in the current experiment, which
used familiar letters, using the consolidation times observed to
have an effect in Ricker and Cowan’s (2014) study of unfamiliar

Experiment 3
In this experiment we replicated Experiment 2, but shortened the
presentation time of the memoranda from 250 ms exposures to 5
0ms exposures to reduce the time available per item for short-term
consolidation. Consolidation of unfamiliar materials into working
memory is quite fast, with orientation being consolidated into
memory within about 600 ms (Ricker & Hardman, 2017; Ricker &
Sandry, 2018). It is plausible that familiar items such as letters
could complete consolidation into working memory in under 500
ms.

Method

Figure 4. Mean proportion correct as a function of retention duration and
consolidation condition in Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard
error of the mean. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

Participants. Seventy-five students attending Montclair State
University participated in the experiment. Fifteen participants were
excluded from data analysis because they demonstrated near
chance level performance (53% correct or less) in one or more
conditions (see Footnote 2). This left a sample size of 60 participants for use in all analyses. All were fluent in English with normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. This experiment was approved by
the Montclair State University Institutional Review Board.
Materials. All materials were the same as in Experiment 2b
(i.e., English consonants).
Design. This experiment used the same design as in Experiments 2a and 2b.
Procedure. The trial sequence was the same as in Experiment
2b, except that each of the three memory array presentations was
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reduced from 250 ms in Experiment 2b to 50 ms in Experiment 3,
for a total onscreen time of 150 ms (3 ⫻ 50 ⫽ 150).
Analysis. The analysis was the same as in Experiments 1
and 2.
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Results
Mean performance in each condition is presented in Figure 5. It
is clear from the figure that forgetting occurred as a function of
time. Reducing the time for consolidation again impaired performance, but did not change the rate of forgetting. A 3 (retention
duration) ⫻ 2 (consolidation condition) repeated measures
ANOVA of mean proportion correct confirms these observations.
This test produced a clear main effect of retention duration, F(2,
118) ⫽ 8.60, p2 ⫽ 0.13, Bayes factor ⫽ 54.5 in favor of an effect,
with performance decreasing as the retention interval increases.
There was again a clear main effect of consolidation time, F(1,
59) ⫽ 59.33, p2 ⫽ 0.50, Bayes factor ⫽ 1.1 ⫻ 109 in favor of an
effect, with more time for consolidation leading to better performance, and there was no interaction between the two factors, F(2,
118) ⫽ 0.30, p2 ⫽ 0.01, Bayes factor ⫽ 20.8 in favor of the null.

Discussion
In Experiment 3 we again observed time-based forgetting in
both consolidation conditions. In contrast to Ricker and Cowan
(2014), we again failed to observe a change in the rate of forgetting
with changes in the time for consolidation. This seems to indicate
that increased consolidation only alters the forgetting rate of unfamiliar materials. We return to the discrepancy between the
present results and the results of Ricker and Cowan (2014) in the
General Discussion.
Despite the failure of consolidation manipulations in altering the
rate of forgetting over time, we still observe time-based forgetting
in the present experiment. If participants are reciting the letter sets
to themselves following memory stimulus presentation then we
should not observe forgetting across the retention interval (Baddeley, 1986; Camos et al., 2009; Cowan, 1995; Page & Norris,
1998). Our set of six letters clearly fits within the proposed limit
of the articulatory loop, about 1.8 s of spoken material (Baddeley
et al., 1975; Cowan et al., 1992; Schweickert & Boruff, 1986) or

Figure 5. Mean proportion correct as a function of retention duration and
consolidation condition in Experiment 3. Error bars represent standard
error of the mean. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

a similar amount of articulatory planning (Caplan, Rochon, &
Waters, 1992; Service, 1998). Although rehearsing all of the
presented letters was clearly attainable, participants may have
perceived a set size of six memory items as large and difficult to
remember. In other studies, change detection tasks with set sizes
over four items often lead to a decrease in the number of items that
are maintained relative to when smaller set sizes are used. This is
presumably because participants become overwhelmed and encode
items from the memory set inefficiently (Cusack, Lehmann, Veldsman, & Mitchell, 2009).
Perhaps the number of items we present, coupled with the
relatively brief presentation time in our current experiments contributes to the observed forgetting rate because participants feel
overwhelmed and do not attempt to actively maintain the memory
items. This would lead to observable trace decay across the retention interval because participants are not counteracting the loss
through maintenance activities as they normally would if a smaller
number of items were presented. If this is the case, then we should
observe reduced or completely absent decay in conditions with
smaller memory sets that are not perceived as overwhelming by
participants. These small set sizes would be rehearsed, or otherwise actively maintained, by the participants. This open question is
examined in Experiments 4 and 5.

Experiment 4
In Experiment 4 we presented either three or six memory items
on each trial, using the presentation method of Experiment 2b. If
large memory sets discourage participants from engaging in active
maintenance, thereby allowing observations of trace decay, then
the smaller set size of three items should encourage verbal rehearsal and lead to less observed decay when compared with a set
size of six. We also manipulated consolidation time as we did in
the previous two experiments in order to check whether the effects
of consolidation differ at smaller set sizes compared to larger set
sizes.

Method
Participants. Eighty-four students attending Montclair State
University participated in the experiment. The threshold for participant exclusion used in the previous experiments (less than 53%
accuracy in one or more conditions) proved too strict in the
remaining experiments reported, with the majority of participants
removed. To be clear, participants did not have difficulty in
performing the general task in the remaining experiments. This
strict criterion would exclude participants for poor performance in
only the most difficult combination of conditions, even if they
performed well in the remaining experiment as a whole. This was
the case for most of the participants that were excluded using the
strict criteria. A new threshold was selected that allowed us to
maintain the majority of participants while still minimizing floor
effects. Participants with very poor overall performance (overall
mean proportion correct less than or equal to .60) were excluded
from analysis to minimize floor effects (see Footnote 2). Data from
four participants was lost due to a computer error and an additional
19 participants were excluded from data analysis because they
demonstrated near chance performance (mean accuracy 60% or
less). This left a sample size of 61 participants for use in all
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analyses. All were fluent in English with normal or corrected-tonormal vision. This experiment was approved by the Montclair
State University Institutional Review Board.
Materials. All materials were the same as in Experiment 2b.
Design. The experiment used a 2 (set size: 3 or 6 items) ⫻ 2
(consolidation condition: 150 ms or 500 ms) ⫻ 3 (retention duration: 1,500 ms, 3,000 ms, or 6,000 ms) within-subjects design.
There were six blocks of 72 trials. There were an equal number of
all combinations of trial types within each block. Trial order was
determined randomly without replacement within each block. Ten
practice trials with an optional repetition preceded the experimental blocks.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2b,
except for two changes. First, the set size was either three or six
memory items in the present experiment. Second, the final memory array presentation was no longer followed by a 250 ms blank
period before the mask. Instead the memory array was followed by
either a 150 ms or 500 ms blank screen. Addition of the set size
manipulation while maintaining equal trials in each condition
doubled the length of the experiment relative to Experiments 1–3.
Analysis. The analysis was the same as in Experiment 1.

Results
Mean performance in each condition is presented in Figure 6.3
In line with the previous experiments, forgetting occurred as a
function of time. Reducing the time for consolidation impaired
performance slightly, but did not change the rate of forgetting. The
set size manipulation had a large effect, as expected, but did not
appear to alter the rate of forgetting. A 3 (retention duration) ⫻ 2
(consolidation condition) ⫻ 2 (set size) repeated measures
ANOVA of mean proportion correct confirms these observations.
This test produced a main effect of retention duration, F(2, 120) ⫽
9.37, p2 ⫽ 0.14, Bayes factor ⫽ 39.1 in favor of an effect, with
performance decreasing as the retention interval increases. There
was indeterminate evidence for the presence of a main effect of
consolidation time, F(1, 60) ⫽ 6.95, p2 ⫽ 0.10, Bayes factor ⫽ 1.2
in favor of an effect, providing only weak support for performance
improvements with more time for consolidation. There was a clear
main effect of Set Size, F(1, 60) ⫽ 354, p2 ⫽ 0.86, Bayes factor ⫽
1.07 ⫻ 10133 in favor of an effect, with a larger Set Size leading

Figure 6. Mean proportion correct as a function of retention duration,
consolidation condition, and set size in Experiment 4. Panel a shows mean
performance at Set Size 3, Panel b shows mean performance at Set Size 6.
Error bars represent standard error of the mean. See the online article for
the color version of this figure.

69

to poorer performance. No interactions were present, all Bayes
factors ⬎10 in favor of the null.

Discussion
Experiment 4 again reveals the same rate of time-based forgetting across all conditions. While changes in the set size clearly
have a large effect on overall performance, the rate of forgetting
across the retention interval did not change in response to changes
in the set size. At this point it seems clear that time-based loss of
familiar verbal materials is consistently observed in change detection. Most past change detection work has differed in that it tends
to use familiar visual items as the memoranda. In the next experiment we test whether the presence of time-based forgetting is
similarly observed with familiar visual memory items.

Experiment 5
Many current models of working memory propose no distinction in how memory items from differing domains are treated if
there is no difference in the ability to apply maintenance strategies
such as rehearsal or chunking (Barrouillet & Camos, 2012; Cowan,
1988; Oberauer et al., 2012; Oberauer & Lin, 2017). In this
experiment we replicated Experiment 4, but used colored squares
as memory items to test whether the same patterns are observed in
the loss of familiar visual items as seen with familiar verbal items
in Experiment 4. The results of Experiments 4 and 5 can be
compared to test whether forgetting rates are equivalent for familiar visual and verbal memory items.

Method
Participants. Seventy-seven students attending Montclair
State University participated in the experiment. Fourteen participants were excluded from data analysis because they demonstrated
near chance performance (overall mean proportion correct less
than or equal to .60; see Footnote 2). This left a sample size of 63
participants for use in all analyses. All were fluent in English with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. This experiment was approved by the Montclair State University Institutional Review
Board.
Materials. Memory items were colored squares 24 ⫻ 24
pixels in size, arranged randomly on the screen. Square color was
randomly selected without replacement from a larger set of colors
(RGB values: 255, 255, 255; 255, 0, 0; 0, 255, 0; 0, 0, 255; 255,
255, 0; 0, 255, 255; 255, 0, 255; 128, 0, 0; 128, 128, 0; 0, 128, 0;
128, 0,128; 0, 128, 128; 0, 0, 128). Masks were the same size and
appeared at the same location as the colored squares. Each mask
was comprised of a pattern of 16 (4 ⫻ 4 grid) randomly selected
colors drawn from the same color set. No mask patterns were the
same on any given trial.
3
Mean accuracy for the Set Size 6 condition was reduced in Experiments 4 and 5 relative to the previous experiments. This is likely due to two
causes. First, the number of total trials was doubled in Experiments 4 and
5 relative to previous experiments, resulting in additional fatigue. Second,
in Experiments 1–3, set size was always fixed at six, whereas in Experiments 4 and 5 there was also an easier set size condition. The presence of
relatively easy Set Size 3 trials likely resulted in a relative feeling of
difficulty when completing Set Size 6 trials. Because of this perceived
difficulty the effort exerted during Set Size 6 trials was likely reduced.
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Design. The design was the same as in Experiment 4.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 4,
except that colors were presented in place of letters.
Analysis. The analysis was the same as in Experiment 4.
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Results
Mean performance in each condition is presented in Figure 7.
The data look very similar to Experiment 4, but perhaps with a
greater rate of forgetting. Forgetting again occurred as a function
of time. As in Experiment 4, reducing the time for consolidation
reduced performance slightly, but did not change the rate of
forgetting. The set size manipulation had a large effect that did not
induce a change in the rate of forgetting. A 3 (retention duration) ⫻ 2 (consolidation condition) ⫻ 2 (set size) repeated measures ANOVA of mean proportion correct confirms these observations. This test produced a clear main effect of retention
duration, F(2, 124) ⫽ 39.32, p2 ⫽ 0.39, Bayes factor ⫽ 4.8 ⫻ 1011
in favor of an effect, with performance decreasing as the retention
interval increases. There was weak evidence for the presence of a
main effect of Consolidation Time, F(1, 62) ⫽ 9.86, p2 ⫽ 0.14,
Bayes factor ⫽ 2.3 in favor of an effect, providing some support
for performance improving with more time for consolidation.
There was also a clear main effect of set size, F(1, 62) ⫽ 524.2,
p2 ⫽ 0.89, Bayes factor ⫽ 3.1 ⫻ 10143 in favor of an effect, with
the larger set size resulting in poorer performance. No interactions
were present, all Bayes factors ⬎10 in favor of the null.
To test whether overall performance or the rate of forgetting
differed between Experiments 4 (letters) and 5 (colors) we conducted a 2 (experiment) ⫻ 3 (retention duration) ⫻ 2 (consolidation condition) ⫻ 2 (set size) Mixed Effects ANOVA of mean
proportion correct on the combined data from both experiments.
There was no main effect of experiment, F(1, 122) ⫽ 0.06, Bayes
factor ⫽ 7.4 in favor of the null. In addition, there was no evidence
for an interaction between experiment and any other factor, all
interactions involving the experiment factor produced Bayes Factors ⬎20 in favor of the null.

Discussion
In Experiment 5 we again observed the same rate of forgetting
over time across all conditions. Beyond this, there was no observ-

Figure 7. Mean proportion correct as a function of retention duration,
consolidation condition, and set size in Experiment 5 (colors). Panel a
shows mean performance at Set Size 3, Panel b shows mean performance
at Set Size 6. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. See the online
article for the color version of this figure.

able difference in performance between Experiment 4, using familiar verbal letters as memory items, and Experiment 5, using
familiar colored squares as memory items. This makes it unlikely
that stimulus domain is a factor in determining if one will observe
decay or in determining the rate of any observed decay. The
finding of a common temporal forgetting rate across differing
domains is consistent with a single working memory system acting
on both types of memory items (Barrouillet & Camos, 2012;
Cowan, 1995; Oberauer et al., 2012; Oberauer & Lin, 2017).

Cross-Experiment Comparison
In each of our five experiments we observe a constant rate of
forgetting across retention durations, regardless of all other manipulations. This raises the question of whether the rate of forgetting is also constant across all experiments. If so, it indicates that
the forgetting rate represents something fundamental and predictable about human memory. In order to test this, we calculated each
participant’s mean accuracy for each retention duration across all
experiments. All of our experiments used the same retention interval durations, allowing us to then directly enter this data into a
mixed-factors ANOVA with retention duration as a withinparticipant factor and Experiment as a between participant factor.
This analysis produced a clear main effect of retention duration,
Bayes factor ⫽ 1.42 ⫻ 1042 in favor of an effect, with longer
retention intervals leading to lower levels of performance. There
was a clear effect of experiment, Bayes factor ⫽ 1.64 ⫻ 1016 in
favor of an effect, with overall performance varying across experiments. More importantly the interaction between retention duration and experiment produced a Bayes Factor with considerable
evidence for a null effect, interaction Bayes factor ⫽ 6.18 in favor
of the null. This invariance across a large number of participants
and experimental conditions provides considerable evidence for a
fundamental cognitive process reflected by the forgetting rate. It
should be noted that a Bayes factor of 6 in favor of the null is
difficult to find, as the peak of the alternative hypothesis is at an
effect size of 0 in the default Bayes factor analysis used here.

General Discussion
The present study clearly demonstrates time-based forgetting of
familiar memory items, supporting the possibility that there is trace
decay. Memory performance declined as the length of the unfilled
retention interval between study and test increased in all tested
conditions. We used considerable samples sizes of between 60 –
143 participants across each of the five experiments to demonstrate
the reliability of time-based forgetting. These large sample sizes
and the consistent replication of the time-based forgetting effects
are important as past studies finding evidence both in favor of and
against decay often used small samples sizes. In our experience
change detection tasks often produce unreliable results with sample sizes of 20 or smaller, regardless of the p value attained in an
ANOVA. Having established that time-based forgetting can be
observed with familiar verbal materials, we explored three specific
questions about trace decay. We asked (a) whether articulatory
suppression plays any roles in determining the rate of decay, (b)
whether the presence of trace decay is a result of insufficient time
for consolidation, and (c) whether familiar verbal and visual memory items show different patterns of trace decay.
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To answer these questions, we manipulated a number of factors
that should affect the presence of observable trace decay under
various working memory models (Baddeley, 1986; Cowan, 1995;
Page & Norris, 1998). These factors include the presence of
articulatory suppression, the time allowed for consolidation after
each memory item, the total memory set size, and the stimulus
modality. None of these factors had an appreciable effect on the
rate of information loss. The answer to all three of our secondary
questions was a clear no, these factors do not alter decay rates. The
rate of forgetting seems to be a constant that occurs regardless of
the strategies available within the memory paradigm or the overall
performance level of the stimuli. Having established that trace
decay does not vary across a variety of contexts we now explore
the implications of our findings in depth.

Decay, Articulatory Suppression, and
Verbal Rehearsal
In adding articulatory suppression to our change-detection task
we assumed that we would be preventing verbal rehearsal of all or
some subset of the memory items in Experiment 1 (Baddeley,
1986; Camos et al., 2009; Cowan et al., 1992). Adding articulatory
suppression during retention lowered overall memory performance
but did not alter the rate of forgetting (see Figure 2). This indicates
that the availability of verbal rehearsal as a maintenance mechanism does not always prevent forgetting, consistent with past
research. Specifically, several previous studies investigating serial
recall of familiar verbal materials demonstrated an overall reduction in accuracy with the addition of articulatory suppression, but
no increase in decay across a retention interval (Lewandowsky et
al., 2004; Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2008; Vallar & Baddeley,
1982).
That articulatory suppression did not prevent or alter the rate of
decay is at odds with traditional phonological loop based models
of working memory (Baddeley, 1986; Baddeley & Logie, 1999;
Page & Norris, 1998). In these models, memory items enter
modality-specific stores and must be continuously recycled
through that store by an active rehearsal process in order to prevent
trace decay. In the case of the verbal store, articulatory suppression
is assumed to occupy the rehearsal mechanism, thereby preventing
the phonological loop from recycling the memory items. This class
of model predicts that when the rehearsal component of the phonological loop is free, such as in our no suppression conditions, no
forgetting is expected for items being rehearsed. On the other
hand, when articulation of the memory set is prevented, as in our
suppression conditions in Experiment 1, there should be considerable trace decay. We saw no indication of the predicted interaction of the retention duration and the suppression condition in
Experiment 1.
Rather than preventing rehearsal it could be that articulatory
suppression disrupts the phonological traces used to code for the
motor component of memory representations (Caplan et al., 1992;
Service, 1998). While familiar verbal materials do clearly show
forgetting over time, the phonological codes themselves may not
decay, instead suffering only interference-based forgetting (Lewandowsky et al., 2004; Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2008). In this
case, articulatory suppression should simply cause a decrease in
overall accuracy by abolishing the contribution of phonological
codes to memory performance. The decay observed here would be
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acting upon some other portion of the memory representation,
perhaps semantic, visual, spatial, or some combination of these
representations.
This explanation intertwines interference explanations of forgetting (Nairne, 1990; Oberauer et al., 2012) with decay and rehearsal
models of working memory (Baddeley, 1986; Barrouillet &
Camos, 2015; Cowan, 1995). Interference is the sole cause of
forgetting with phonological materials, but decay still occurs
within nonphonological representations. In other ways, this explanation is difficult to reconcile with most past models. Many
interference models explicitly exclude the existence of decay in
any working memory representations (Nairne, 1990; Oberauer et
al., 2012). The assumptions about the role of rehearsal in many
decay models are themselves incompatible with the limited effect
of articulatory rehearsal (see Baddeley, 1986; Page & Norris,
1998). In the present work, the phonological representation that is
abolished by articulatory suppression in Experiment 1 only diminishes overall accuracy slightly, by about one letter remembered,
from 3.9 to 3.1 letters when calculated using Cowan’s k (Cowan,
2001). This is inconsistent with the consensus that rehearsal can
maintain about 1.8s worth of phonological information (Baddeley
et al., 1975; Cowan et al., 1992; Schweickert & Boruff, 1986).
Rather than relying strongly on the phonological code, working
memory performance seems to be strongly driven by maintenance
of nonphonological material. This is more consistent with models
emphasizing a strong role for attention-based maintenance of
representations across modalities (Barrouillet et al., 2004; Cowan,
1995, 2005; Oberauer et al., 2012).
The present findings seem to imply that verbal rehearsal is not
used to maintain the continued activation of phonological memory
traces. Instead, there may be a relationship between verbal rehearsal and memory retention because verbal rehearsal is the
outcome of maintaining phonological traces. Activity in areas
representing speech information could lead to or prime speech
behavior, accounting for the appearance of a causal relationship
between rehearsal and memory. If the phonological memory traces
do not decay, then there is no need for a memory mechanism
dedicated to preventing their decay. This suggestion is not new,
although it is uncommon. Several previous researchers have proposed that verbal rehearsal does not improve working memory
performance (G. D. A. Brown & Hulme, 1995; Nairne, 2002). In
particular Souza and Oberauer (2018) recently observed and manipulated the rehearsal schedules of participants maintaining lists
of words. While those that rehearsed more often tended to have
better memory performance, increasing their rehearsal rates
through task-condition instructions did not improve performance.
Our present results converge with these findings, suggesting that
the availability of rehearsal does not change the rate of forgetting,
at least for our familiar items presented in spatial arrays.

Alternative Conceptions of Decay and Forgetting
In the previous section, we proposed that the time-based forgetting observed here results from decay in the nonphonological
portions of the memory trace. An alternative interpretation is that
all memory traces are treated the same, regardless of the nature of
the representation, that is, phonological, semantic, visual, and so
forth. This is the approach taken by many models of memory
(Barrouillet et al., 2004; Cowan, 1995; Oberauer & Lin, 2017),
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particularly interference models positing no trace decay (Nairne,
1990; Oberauer et al., 2012). In this approach to our findings, the
locus of time-based forgetting is not the memory representation
itself, as is the case with trace decay of neural activation, but
instead follows from an increasing probability of task disengagement as time progresses. Memory performance decreases over
time because the individual engaging in active maintenance has
some probability of losing focus on the current task and thinking
about unrelated thoughts such as their weekend plans, the comfort
level of their shoes, or some other irrelevant thought. Within the
working memory literature, unintentionally losing focus on the
task and engaging in task unrelated thinking has been referred to as
mind wandering (Feng, D’Mello, & Graesser, 2013; Kane et al.,
2007; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). If a there is a constant
probability of losing focus on the current task during each unit of
time, then this should lead to an increase in mind wandering with
an increased retention interval.
There could be two effects as a result of mind-wandering. First,
if an item decays from memory (either gradually or all at once)
when it is not being refreshed via attention, then mind-wandering
would remove that possibility of refreshing and allow decay to
proceed. Second, during mind-wandering, internal attentional resources within working memory might be redirected away from
the to-be-remembered stimulus and toward something unrelated,
ultimately leading to a form of endogenous interference that disrupts the memory trace. Behaviorally we would then observe lower
mean performance and more guessing with longer retention times,
what we have referred to in the past as a minimal definition of
decay (Cowan, Saults, & Nugent, 1997; Ricker et al., 2016). This
approach does not posit that time is the cause of forgetting, but
rather that the passage of time results in a predictable rate of
forgetting. If the rate of mind wandering is equivalent across
experiments and manipulations within the present study, then this
approach provides a good fit to the present data.
Previous research suggests that a relationship between mind
wandering and the rate of forgetting over time is plausible. Past
work has suggested that displacement of the contents of working
memory by distracting or irrelevant material is a major contributor
to forgetting (Craik & Levy, 1976; Unsworth & Engle, 2007;
Waugh & Norman, 1965). Greater rates of mind wandering during
tasks such as reading and studying are also related to lower
working memory performance across individuals (Kane et al.,
2007; McVay & Kane, 2012; Unsworth & McMillan, 2013).
Moment-to-moment reports of mind wandering are related to
disruption of ongoing cognitive performance (Feng et al., 2013;
McVay & Kane, 2009) including performance on working memory tasks (Adam & Vogel, 2017; Krimsky, Forster, Llabre, & Jha,
2017; Mrazek et al., 2012; Robison & Unsworth, 2018; Unsworth
& Robison, 2016), consistent with the idea that mind wandering
leads to displacement of the contents of working memory. Future
studies should explicitly examine the relationship between mind
wandering and rates of time-based forgetting across individuals to
judge whether this explanation is viable.
If mind wandering is producing the observed time-based loss of
memory performance here and elsewhere (Lilienthal et al., 2014;
Ricker & Cowan, 2010, 2014; Sakai & Inui, 2002; Vergauwe et al.,
2014), it implies that trace decay or memory decay may be a
misleading moniker. Decay in the mind-wandering context reflects
forgetting due to task disengagement or endogenous interference,

not forgetting caused by loss of activation within a specific memory trace as is typically envisioned by trace decay advocates
(Baddeley et al., 1975; Barrouillet & Camos, 2015; Cowan, 1995;
Page & Norris, 1998; Ricker, 2015). Cowan et al. (1997, p. 396)
offered three different definitions of decay, the first of which refers
to any predictable rate of forgetting across time, and the second of
which did refer to interference from internal thoughts that might be
partly controllable and partly beyond control. Increasing displacement of traces from working memory with the passage of time is
consistent with these descriptions of decay in that memory performance decreases across a retention interval at a measurable rate. It
is, however, inconsistent with what is generally meant when the
construct of memory decay is invoked. The decay in this approach
is not occurring at the level of specific memory items, is not caused
by the passage of time, and does not occur gradually across a trial.
The observed performance decay is on the likelihood of the individual continuing to stay engaged in the memory task as the
retention interval increases and on the resulting level of observed
performance when aggregated across many trials.
Dissociating interference and decay theories of forgetting is
often complex (e.g., see, Barrouillet et al., 2013). It is difficult to
introduce a distracting task that will prevent rehearsal and
attention-based refreshing, remove the contribution of attention so
it does not diminish across retention intervals through mindwandering, and not introduce exogenous interference. The few
studies that have come closest to meeting these requirements
(Reitman, 1974; Watkins et al., 1973) tend to support the existence
of decay that is not caused by mind-wandering. Just as one can
argue for the absence of decay in some situations despite the
inclusion of some potential distraction (Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2008), here we argue for the presence of decay in
other situations even without the inclusion of a rehearsal- or
refreshing-prevention task.

No Effect of Consolidation Time on Forgetting Rates
Recent work by Ricker and Cowan (2014) demonstrated that
allowing more time for consolidation after the presentation of a
memory item or set leads to lower rates of time-based forgetting.
This study served as the template and motivation for Experiments
2a and 2b. In the present set of experiments, we failed to replicate
the findings of Ricker and Cowan (2014), instead finding no effect
of the time available for consolidation on the rate of forgetting
over time. We replicated the present lack of an effect of consolidation time on forgetting rates in Experiments 2–5, across a range
of conditions, confirming the validity of the present result.
The only major difference between Experiments 2a and 2b and
the experiments of Ricker and Cowan (2014) is that the present
experiments used familiar letters as the memoranda while Ricker
and Cowan (2014) used unfamiliar symbols. Within a model of
time-based forgetting as decay of nonphonological traces, it is
unclear why consolidation should be effective at preventing memory decay with unfamiliar characters but not with familiar letters.
One possibility is that the difficulty of processing unfamiliar
characters during consolidation is more effortful and results in the
allocation of more attention to the task, indirectly improving later
performance. We can also consider consolidation effects on timebased forgetting from the mind-wandering perspective. It may be
that altering the time for consolidation after each letter in the

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

DO FAMILIAR ITEMS DECAY?

present task does not change how engaging the task is for participants, but increasing the time for consolidation after each unfamiliar character by Ricker and Cowan (2014) did change how
engaging the task was for participants.
If time-based forgetting is a reflection of mind wandering, then
only factors that encourage or discourage sustained task engagement should alter the rate of loss. It is easy to imagine that in
Ricker and Cowan’s (2014) experiments with increased free time
after each unfamiliar character participants found the unfamiliar
items increasingly more engaging. For example, thinking about a
novel item for a longer time may emphasize its novelty, resulting
in better capture of attention and a lower probability of mind
wandering a few seconds later. This difference in attention capture
by the memory stimulus could account for the across study difference in consolidation effects between the present work and Ricker
and Cowan (2014). More attentional capture by the unfamiliar
characters as compared with the letters task means more task
engagement and a lower observed forgetting rate in high consolidation conditions of Ricker and Cowan (2014).

Familiar Memory Items Are Forgotten Over Time
Experiments 4 and 5 of the present work only differed in the
nature of the memory items. Experiment 4 used familiar verbal
letters while Experiment 5 used familiar colored squares. These
memory items clearly differ in modality. Letters are generally
assumed to be verbal in nature while colors are considered to be
visual in nature. Despite this difference, the results of the two
experiments were the same. When we entered both sets of data into
a single ANOVA with experiment as a factor, there was no effect
of experiment and no interaction of experiment with any other
factor. This demonstrates that the locus of the time-based forgetting effect does not stem from the modality of the memory stimuli.
Memory items presented in an array are lost over time regardless
of the memory item modality. This resolves a conflict between
findings from the serial recall literature, in which familiar verbal
memory items do not show evidence of time-based loss, and
findings from the visual working memory literature using array
presentation of unfamiliar visual characters, in which memory
items consistently show time-based loss. It is not the verbal/visual
or familiar/unfamiliar distinction that drives the existence of forgetting over time, but rather something about the distinction between serial recall and visual array change detection.
There are several potential explanations for this distinction
between serial recall and visual array findings. From a trace decay
perspective, serial recall performance may rely primarily on phonological representations that do not show trace decay while visual
array performance may encourage reliance on visual representations that do show trace decay, at the expense of phonological
representations. If this is the case then we should not observe trace
decay in serial recall paradigms as phonological traces do not
suffer decay. Another possibility is that the visual representations
of verbal materials are used only because spatial location is available as a cue. If, for example, the probe always appeared centrally,
spatial location cues would no longer be useful and participants
may encode the letters verbally.
If we instead follow the mind wandering explanation of timebased forgetting, it could be that visual array experiments are
simply less engaging than serial recall experiments. This would
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result in more task-unrelated thoughts during the retention intervals of visual array trials as compared to serial recall trials.
Research by Rouder et al. (2008) indicates that participants in
visual array studies fail to sustain attention to the task on a
significant number of trials. In their work participants did not
attend to the visual array task on 12% of the total trials across the
experiment, despite there being no secondary task (see also, R. D.
Morey, 2011). If a considerable portion of these attentional lapses
happen during memory retention, as opposed to encoding or recall,
it could easily account for our observed rates of forgetting in the
present work.

Contrast With Previous Findings
The present findings differ notably from several previous findings. One set of findings are our previous investigations of timebased forgetting in verbal working memory. Ricker and Cowan
(2010, Experiment 2) investigated whether arrays of letters were
forgotten over time using nearly the same task as we use in the
present work. Ricker and Cowan (2010) found that there was no
loss of memory over time for letter arrays when there was no
secondary task and no articulatory suppression, in agreement with
the predictions of phonological loop models. This is in stark
contrast to the present series of experiments in which we observe
robust forgetting across the same retention interval duration, set
size, and presentation time as used by Ricker and Cowan (2010).
Ricker et al. (2014) also found time-based loss of letter arrays in
a change detection task, in agreement with the present findings, but
in contrast to (Ricker & Cowan, 2010).
In the present work and in that of Ricker and Cowan (2010), the
trials that contain no secondary task have no obvious methodological differences that could explain the discrepancy. There were
methodological differences between the two experiments in the
way the overall experimental session was experienced by the
participant. Ricker and Cowan (2010) manipulated retention duration between trials within each experimental block while manipulating the secondary task (none, number reading, simple arithmetic) and memory stimulus (letters or unfamiliar characters)
between blocks. Similarly, Experiment 1 of the present work
manipulated retention duration between trials within each experimental block and suppression condition between blocks. Although
the basic design is similar, it is possible that the between-block
changes in secondary task and stimulus identity by Ricker and
Cowan (2010) promoted greater task engagement during the letter
trials than in the present experiments. If this is the case then we
would predict that Ricker and Cowan (2010) should show lower
rates of forgetting than the present work. It should be noted
however that many experiments use similar task designs to the
present work, with a consistent task across 40 min or more, making
the design far from exceptional in this respect.
The present findings also contrast with the wide body of work in
serial recall of verbal memory items showing no forgetting as a
function of retention time (Lewandowsky et al., 2004; Oberauer &
Lewandowsky, 2008, 2014). There are several differences between
these serial recall studies and the present work that could account
for the difference. One difference is that serial recall studies rely
upon recall rather than correct probe recognition. Uittenhove,
Chaabi, Camos, and Barrouillet (2019) recently suggested fundamental differences in how items are maintained when recall or
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recognition are required at test. Uittenhove et al. (2019) support
this claim with data showing considerable difference in memory
performance for the same task when recall is required rather than
recognition. Recall by its very nature should promote greater task
engagement than recognition because active production of a response is required at test with recall whereas verification of an
item produced for the participant is all that is required with
recognition. Studies requiring memory recall should produce lower
forgetting rates than studies utilizing memory recognition tests
following a task-engagement theory of time-based forgetting, so
long as all other factors are equated. Balota and Neely (1980)
produced data supporting this prediction, showing that participants
performed better on both recognition and recall tests of memory
when expecting recall compared with when they expected a recognition test.
There are a number of other differences between typical serial
recall procedures and the current change detection task that could
potentially encourage greater task engagement during serial recall.
Typical serial recall tasks include longer presentation times, participant controlled presentation timings, manipulation of the delay
period between memory item presentations or between memory
item recalls (change detection typically uses a retention interval
between item presentation and test), and fewer trials overall. All of
these factors may lead to less mind wandering and result in lower
rates of time-based forgetting.
We do not assert that the serial recall research is wrong in its
finding no time-based forgetting in those procedures or that change
detection is the only method that should be used when studying
patterns of forgetting over time. We demonstrate that time-based
forgetting of familiar memory items can be reliably observed
within working memory paradigms. Temporal factors may not
account for the majority of observed forgetting within any given
study, but that does not imply that loss of familiar memory items
with the passage of time is a myth.

Concluding Remarks
The present work shows that time-based forgetting does occur,
even with familiar verbal memory items. This forgetting may not
be the traditional trace decay operating upon individual memory
activations, but that does not mean memory performance does not
decrease as more time is required between presentation and test.
Neither does our argument in favor of the existence of decay for
nonphonological traces necessarily imply that interference does
not cause forgetting. One possibility we explicitly endorse is that
phonological representations may be lost exclusively through interference. Our goal is not to advocate for a temporal-only theory
of forgetting, but rather that room must be made for temporal
factors within current theories. Parsimony is not served by denying
the effect of time on forgetting.
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